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Abstract
This paper discusses how Mozambique coped with the health system needs in terms of specialized
doctors since independence, in a troubled context of war, lack of financial resources and modifying
settings of foreign aid. The Ministry of Health (MOH) managed to make up for its severe scarcity
of specialist MDs especially through contracting expatriate technical assistance. Different scenarios,
partnerships and contract schemes that have evolved since independence are briefly described, as
well as self-reliance option possibility and implications. Lessons learned about donor initiatives
aimed at contracting specialists from other developing countries are singled out. The issue of
obtaining expertise and knowledge in the global market as cheap as possible is stressed, and realistic
figures of cost planning are highlighted, as determined by the overall health system necessities and
budget limitations.
Background
Shortly after independence (1975), the mass repatriation
of the Portuguese cadres working in the Health System left
the MOH with the urgent need of finding specialized
medical doctors (MD) for its referral hospitals. In 1972
there were 289 MDs in the country [1]. In 1976, only
about 60 MDs had remained [2]. The solution was found
thanks to the assistance of the socialist countries, which
promptly provided a contingent of mainly Russian and
Cuban doctors. The political and economic collapse of the
socialist block after 1990 caused a new crisis, threatening
to leave hospitals without specialized MDs. After a rather
chaotic period, the situation improved in 1996, through
the activation of a pool funded by Switzerland, the Neth-
erlands and Norway, which granted salaries for senior spe-
cialists, mainly from the former USSR republics, and kept
the best of them in place. Under what was called the
"pooling agreement", the MOH identified the need for
personnel and took care of selection, supervision and
assessment, while UNDP administered the contracting
and payment of salaries. Meanwhile, national specialists
were slowly increasing in number, but they continued to
be insufficient to satisfy the public system needs. Moreo-
ver, virtually all of them were working in Maputo. As a
way to encourage the few national medical specialists to
work outside the capital, the MOH and Switzerland
agreed a salary scheme (known as 'topping up'), which
filled the gap between the public sector and expatriate sal-
ary scales working out of Maputo. In the meantime, bilat-
eral cooperation still held a key role; in 1999, of a total of
406 MDs holding clinical posts, there were 204 foreigners
abiding by different kinds of contract [3], most of them
through inter-governmental agreements with Cuba and,
to a lesser extent, China and Nigeria. This state of affairs
remained almost unchanged until 2004.
The health sector in Mozambique is heavily dependent on
external financial support (about 60% of the budget in
2004), while donors are progressively dropping financial
mechanisms aimed at particular health programs or sec-
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tors for a broader policy of budget support. Dependence
could increase with the expected worsening of the AIDS
epidemic. The new AIDS program in Mozambique, aimed
at rapidly expanding the access to ARV treatment for
AIDS-patients, will create more demand for MDs, in a
country where the estimated number of HIV-positive peo-
ple presently amounts to 1 400 000. The total salary bill is
increasing because of the growth of the entire health
workforce (to cope with the new demand brought by
AIDS) and because of a faster increase of graduated and
middle level cadres [4].
Specialised MDs in the national health system (NHS)
More than 90% of the health system is made up of a mul-
titude of minuscule health centres and posts with very
basic resources, and managed by elementary and basic
level health personnel. In spite of figures of MD per capita
in Mozambique being among the lowest in the world,
work load for MDs and specialists working in the coun-
try's few sizeable hospitals does not look particularly
high, at least not higher than what may be found in other
sub-Saharan African Countries. [5,6].
Table 1 shows the strong concentration of specialist MDs
in Maputo, most of them working at the capital Central
Hospital (which employs 143). Many of the national ones
work part-time in the private sector. The Maputo Central
Hospital, by far the biggest health facility and the main
centre for the clinical training of students from the State
Medical School or in post-graduation training courses, is
able to autonomously manage substantial funds (cur-
rently about USD 8 000 000 per year) obtained through
the provision of semi-private services. This situation is
unique in the NHS. Most of the money is used to pay
incentives to the hospital workers and to hire new ones; in
both instances, MDs are the main beneficiaries[7]. More-
over, the majority of the country's few private for-profit
medical services are located in Maputo.
Table 2 shows that most of the posts outside the capital
are occupied by foreign specialists. Nearly all 23 nationals
who work in the same places as well benefit from the top-
ping up scheme. It was shown that the scarcity of special-
ists is worsened still by the uneven distribution between
Provincial Hospitals of the same level, especially when
compared to the work load of each hospital, as illustrated
in Table 3[8].
Pooling contract mechanism
Most specialists hired through the pooling mechanism are
senior cadres with a long in-country experience, working
out of the capital, which puts their cost relatively high, but
rewards the health system with higher reliability. The
number of doctors paid by this scheme oscillated between
50 and 60 annually, from 1996 to March 2000, the year in
which donors withdrew their support from MD pooling
[9]. In 2000 a study found that the pooling for specialized
MDs and topping up greatly improved the overall situa-
tion, especially in previously neglected hospitals in the
Northern and Central regions. The programmes 'enabled
the NHS to select competent/productive cadres through
transparent and competitive processes ... ensuring loyalty
and discipline' [3]. It was also recognized that the new
contractual environment improved productivity and
human relationships of the MDs coming from the ex-
socialist countries. Afterwards, the responsibility for con-
tracting foreign MDs fell directly on the MOH managers
and the bill was assumed by the State Budget, which is, in
turn, is heavily financed by donors through the general
budget support mechanism. However, spending difficul-
ties due to weakness in financial management and to con-
flicting interests between the MOH directorates made the
contracting of foreign specialists a rather troubled matter
in the last years.
Pooling was unanimously considered a simple and suc-
cessful initiative. Its dismissal was blamed, among others,
'on strained communication between the MOH and
financers, lack of consensus between donors, poor coordi-
nation inside the MOH, unclear roles of involved parties
and unrealistic expectations about the quick replacement
of foreign physicians with national ones' [9].
Topping up
The MOH and the Swiss Development Cooperation
(SDC) have agreed a 'topping up' for national specialized
MDs since 1997. It allows the MOH to have senior
national cadres in all referral hospitals, with tasks of
Table 2: MDs within and outside the capital, Mozambique, 2004
Foreigners Nationals
Provinces Specialists GP Specialists GP Total
Maputo 96 5 77 136 314
Outside Maputo 102 19 23 181 325
Total 1 9 82 41 0 0 3 1 7 6 3 9
Table 1: Distribution of specialists, per region, Mozambique, 
2004
Percentage
Provinces Specialists Population Hospital beds
Town of Maputo 173 7.6 15.1
Other southern provinces 20 18.6 23.7
Central provinces 54 20.8 34.9
Northern provinces 51 53.6 26.3
Total 298 100 100Human Resources for Health 2006, 4:26 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/4/1/26
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enforcing therapeutic and procedural national norms,
coordination, supervision and teaching. Between 11 and
15 national specialists were contracted annually under
this scheme until 2002. Currently their number is increas-
ing. By topping up, national specialists could gradually
replace expatriate ones contracted by the previous pooling
agreement. A Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) financial
scheme replaced the SDC as topping up financer in 2004;
more posts are expected to be filled (25) by the gradually
increasing number of newly trained specialists.
Government bilateral agreement (GBA)
Direct Government agreements offer the advantage of
lower transactional costs compared to individual con-
tracts. On the side of Mozambique the only duty is to
identify the needed specialities and to map the vacancies
nationwide. However, it implies a very centralized proc-
ess, where the headquarters makes a national plan and
contracts the MD on behalf of every hospital involved.
This approach seems at odds with the public sector
reforms undertaken in Mozambique, directed to allow
more autonomy in fund and resource management at
lower levels of decision making. As elsewhere in health
management, it is difficult to define a fair trade-off
between efficiency gains and a sound management built
on local capacity. Moreover, as in other African countries
[10], almost all MDs contracted through government
agreements (74 people) are Cubans. This option is based
on the traditional friendship between the two countries
and offers the advantage of a fast adaptation of the MDs,
because of similarities of language and climate. However,
this situation also creates some degree of dependency on
a single source of supply without the possibility of exercis-
ing much control. In order to counter-balance some of the
possible shortcomings, the government has chosen to
diversify the recruitment countries and thus assure itself of
a maximum of control over the supply situation.
Individual contracts
Most doctors under this scheme come from developing
countries, had been previously contracted under a GBA,
and are continuing on an individual basis after their first
contract terms came to an end. A very small fraction is
made up of Portuguese doctors who remained in Mozam-
bique after independence, or by MD catholic priests will-
ing to work within the NHS.
In sum, a kind of osmosis exists between the different cat-
egories of expatriate specialists. Part of those contracted
through bilateral agreements, after fulfilling their terms,
manage to remain in Mozambique, shifting to 'ex-pool-
ing' mechanisms or other kinds of individual contracts
and/or, in some cases, to private practice. Thus, through a
process of selection between expatriate specialists and a
group of long-term residents, culturally and socially inte-
grated MDs emerged as a structural and considerable com-
ponent of the medical workforce in Mozambique.
Table 4 compares the financial burden of each kind of
contract. Administrative costs, such as those associated
with contract writing are higher for individual contracts.
However, housing and travel costs are greater for the MDs
hired through bilateral agreement than for individually
contracted MDs.
Specialized MD costs and availability
Local Technical Assistance (TA) in Africa is becoming
increasingly expensive [11]. At least in Mozambique, pub-
lic salaries, after a long period of depreciation, are now
improving and outweighing gains in productivity [12].
The total annual average cost in 2003 for an NHS special-
ized MD was already about 7000 US$ at a moment when
the debate to 'decompress' salary scales in the public sec-
tor was gaining momentum [13,14]. Besides salary, other
personnel-related benefits include housing and fuel subsi-
Table 3: Work load per MD in 2003 in Mozambique's ten largest hospitals
Hospital Beds Beds per MD Occupied bed days per MD Deliveries per gynaecologist
Lichinga 186 17 5809 3712
Pemba 224 19 4472 1793
Nampula 313 10 4180 4049
Quelimane 457 22 5986 936
Tete 324 23 5976 3241
Chimoio 371 25 7850 2248
Beira 746 15 4799 1723
Inhambane 230 23 5350 2134
Xai-Xai 222 28 9553 3004
Maputo 1499 6 1740 829
Total/average 4572 11 3307 1138Human Resources for Health 2006, 4:26 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/4/1/26
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dies, use of service cars, etc. These figures compare well
with the salaries paid in more developed countries such as
Cuba, Russia, Ukraine or India. As a matter of fact, emigra-
tion of Mozambican MDs to Europe until now has been
limited, especially compared with that from the other Por-
tuguese-speaking African countries [15].
In Mozambique, it is the limited availability of medical
specialists which puts salaries relatively high. Moreover,
their scarce number means a profitable market for the
suppliers, because the demand for better, individual serv-
ices is constantly increasing among the growing urban
bourgeoisie.
As in many other countries [16], most Mozambican spe-
cialists moonlight, while still keeping a foot in the NHS as
a way of establishing their reputation within private prac-
tice, while benefiting from public sector securities and
advantages. As a matter of fact, until 2002 the topping up
scheme often failed to fill all its posts, showing that better
salaries were not sufficient to move enough national spe-
cialists from their positions in Maputo.
At present, the availability of newly trained national spe-
cialists is increasing, notwithstanding the shortage of
young MDs and the scarcity of training hospital capacity
for all but the most basic specialities. The State Medical
School (UEM) has trained MDs at a discouragingly low
pace. On average, from 1975 to 2003, 22 MDs were
trained annually in Mozambique. Drop-out rates have
been astonishingly high, as well as unit training costs. This
was ascribed to many difficulties such as poor high school
preparation, lack of books and bibliography, erratic fol-
low-up by tutors in the teaching at Maputo central hospi-
tal and insufficient financial support. Students are also
unsatisfied with the burden of lecturing and quality of
teaching [17].
A curricular reform is now under way together with the
hiring of new lecturers (mainly from Cuba), and in the
next three years these figures are expected to rise to 50–60
MD/year. Figures will still grow to an average of 120 MD
trained per annum after 2007, when a new, private Uni-
versity in the central town of Beira, a recent institution
functioning since 2001, will begin to yield its first gradu-
ates.
Between 1991 and 2002, the average annual output of
specialized Mozambican MDs inside and outside the
country has been only 7. In 2003, 21 new MDs completed
their post-graduation, and 70 more are expected to be
trained between 2004 and 2007.
Discussion
The salary gap between nationals and expatriates for
vacancies outside the capital was already being closed by
the topping-up scheme. Eventually, no substantial savings
from the substitution of foreign MDs with national MDs
should be expected. The international oversupply of MDs
(a by-product of socialist regime health policy) floods the
global market with a large supply of well-trained, disci-
plined and relatively cheap specialized cadres, who could
be hired for reasonable salaries to work in countries where
lack of MDs is still severe. It has been argued that "self-reli-
ance is not the ultimate objective, in a world where all
countries are competing for intellectual capital on a global
basis, and when foreign aid is as much about knowledge
as it is about money" [18].
Although medical students originate from all the coun-
try's provinces, once they are admitted by the State Uni-
versity, their expectation is to obtain a job in the capital
city. This is the first of many 'pull factors' which will main-
tain the high concentration of MDs in Maputo, to where
they will return once their two-year term of mandatory
rural employment as junior doctors is completed [19]. In
fact, as in many other developing countries, extra-earning
possibilities, living and working conditions, career per-
spectives and professional improvement opportunities
are far better in the capital city, for the beginner as well as
Table 4: Specialist MDs contracted by the MOH, February 2004
Contract & salary schemes N Average monthly salary (US$) Origin Fund source Total annual cost (US$)
Bilateral agreement 86 1000 Mainly Cuban State budget 1 032 000
Topping up 19 1647** Mozambican SDC/CF 375 516
"Ex-Pooling" 32 2906 Mix CF* 1 115 904
Standard individual contract 50 1300 Mix State budget 780 000
Individual, the same as NHS 14 597 Mix State budget 100 296
Sub-Total 201 1411 - - 3 403 716
Nationals (NHS salary) 78 563 Mozambican State budget 655 332
Grand total 298 1135 - - 4 059 048
* Common fund
** Just topping up by donors. These doctors receive also a monthly average of about US$ 563 by the NHS, whose annual total cost can be found 
under 'NHS salary, total annual cost'.
*** Housing & travel allowances not included.Human Resources for Health 2006, 4:26 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/4/1/26
Page 5 of 6
(page number not for citation purposes)
for the most capable and experienced physicians. Other
national MDs could migrate to the developed world (Por-
tugal) or to neighbouring countries, such as South Africa
and Botswana, where AIDS is taking a heavy toll on
human resources for health [20]. Moreover, international
NGOs managing AIDS programs will open new posts and
opportunities for the health professionals in Mozam-
bique. If economic growth in Mozambique keeps up the
pace recorded in the first ten years following the civil war
(implying a real GDP growth of 41.1% for the years 2004–
2008 [21]), a considerable fraction of the new specialists
will be absorbed by private practice, mainly in Maputo.
Thus, the gap between the demand for, and the availabil-
ity of, specialized MDs could increase in the next 5–10
years. From a public sector perspective, however, an
increase in specialist MDs outside the capital must take
into account their current work load and the possibilities
of growth and re-qualification of the few existing referral
health facilities. It must also be noted that specialist MDs
are just marginally involved in supervising the peripheral
network, initial training and on-the-job-training of medi-
cal assistants, nurses and midwives, despite the fact that
these lesser skilled cadres are the backbone of the clinical
activities, especially at the periphery of the health system.
The national political option to carry out a public sector
decentralization policy could give rise to more individual
contracts of national or expatriate MDs but, as it has been
observed, decentralization has often remained a dis-
course, with civil service reform having been announced
several times, but never really having materialized [22]. It
should be central to an improvement in management
capacity (a rather intricate issue to implement, as it proved
in practice [23]) and to transferring substantial financial
responsibility from the headquarters to the provincial
health directorates and hospitals. At present, only the
Maputo Central Hospital has enough money and compe-
tence to act autonomously. Private recruiting agencies act-
ing worldwide could more efficiently provide value for
money and the role of comprehensive bilateral agree-
ments could be reduced. However, individual contracts
managed directly by hospitals would entail higher trans-
action costs, particularly in the initial stages.
Conclusion
Expatriate MD contracting in Mozambique has been a his-
tory of effective policy and also a rare example of sound
pragmatism which prevailed against old-fashioned
nationalist wishful thinking. The way a pooling mecha-
nism supported by the donor community funded the sal-
aries of high level expatriate medical cadres directly
chosen by the recipient country, has been a positive, note-
worthy experience. Allopathic medicine speaks the same
language everywhere. Universally, medical universities
offer remarkably homogeneous curricula; doctors update
their knowledge through the same basket of international
medical literature. In the global market the medical pro-
fession is rather easy to sell and purchase. When expatriate
doctors learn the immigration country's language and
health system rules, their integration is quickly achieved.
For ordinary referral hospitals posts, lack of sophisticated
diagnostic devices and expensive drugs make specialists
from other developing countries more suitable to the
local situation than their first-world counterparts, who are
used to working in a more 'professional' environment,
with technical support and at a cost too distant from what
they could find in Mozambique. In global terms, a redis-
tribution of the medical workforce, acting on economical
incentives – from countries where it is excessive to coun-
tries where it is still scarce – makes sense and should be
encouraged. In the end, at least in Mozambique, expatri-
ate specialists do not cost significantly more than national
ones. Increasing budget support by the donors should
enable governments to recruit specialized MDs from
countries where expertise is reasonably cheap, such as
Cuba, the former Soviet Union, China and India. Thus, as
a little contribution to alleviate the enormous health
problems of Africa, a pattern of "poor"-to-"poor" cooper-
ation, may be encouraged, supported financially by the
wealthy North – a system that has proven to have been
cost-effective in Mozambique.
The two different kinds of contracts for specialized MDs
(through a bilateral government agreement and on indi-
vidual basis), proved to be equally useful, offering balanc-
ing advantages to the health system. In the future, real
willingness to decentralise responsibilities and compe-
tences, improvement in management capacity and cost
considerations would be the factors favouring individual
instead of collective contracting mechanisms for employ-
ment of expatriate MDs.
From a Mozambican perspective, a sustained increase of
specialised MDs in the public sector outside the capital
district would be fully meaningful only if it were in line
with an upgrading of the health system as a whole (espe-
cially of the small intermediate portion made up of rural
and district hospitals), and/or if these cadres were more
thoroughly employed in activities of training and supervi-
sion. In the first case, the critical health policy issue would
be about how and where to direct major investments
financed from the scarce resources available. In the second
one, an efficient way of coordinating activities of systemic
supervision, on-the-job training of the supervised cadres
and initial training must be found, which means for the
most differentiate referral units to take responsibility for
the medical care provided in all the health facilities within
their catchment area. Otherwise, it would be nonsensical
to hire expensive, well-qualified health cadres without
adequately using their skills. A more balanced distribu-Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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tion, based on work load comparisons between hospitals
of the same level, could also be useful in improving effi-
ciency. Finally, the option of improving high-quality
health services must be weighed up against the needs of
expanding a primary health network which, at the
moment, barely gives access to 50% of the population.
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